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Abstract
In this paper, I argue, contrary to the prevailing opinion in the linguistics and phi-
losophy literature, that a sortal approach to aspectual composition can indeed be
explanatory. In support of this view, I develop a synthesis of competing proposals
by Hinrichs, Krifka and Jackendoff which takes Jackendoff’s cross-cutting sortal
distinctions as its point of departure. To show that the account is well-suited for
computational purposes, I also sketch an implemented calculus of eventualities
which yields many of the desired inferences. Further details on both the model-
theoretic semantics and the implementation can be found in [26].
Dans cet article, je propose, contrairement aux opinions pre´ponde´rantes dans la
litte´rature linguistique et philosophique, qu’une theorie “sortale” de la composition
aspectuelle peut eˆtre explicative. Comme justification de cette the`se, je de´veloppe
une synthe`se des the´ories en compe´tition de Hinrichs, de Krifka et de Jackendoff,
qui prend comme point de de´part les distinctions sortales multi-dimensionelles de
Jackendoff. Afin de montrer que la solution pre´sente´e peut eˆtre exploite´e compu-
tationellement, j’esquisse un calcul d’e´ventualite’s imple´mente´ qui permet de faire
beaucoup des infe´rences desire´es. Des de´tails supple´mentaires sur la se´mantique
a` base de mode`les et sur l’imple´mentation peuvent eˆtre trouve´s dans [26].
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partially supported by an NSF Graduate Fellowship. For helpful comments and discussion, the author
thanks Mark Steedman, Richard Oehrle, Alessandro Zucchi, Barbara Di Eugenio, Matthew Stone,
Christine Doran, Owen Rambow and two anonymous reviewers.
1 Introduction
In recent years, it has become common in the linguistics and philosophy literature
to assume that events and processes are ontologically distinct entities, on a par
with objects and substances. At the same time, the idea that episodic knowledge
should be represented as a collection of interrelated eventualities has gained increasing
acceptance in the computational linguistics and artificial intelligence literature.
Contrary to what one might expect, a search through the prior literature in linguis-
tics and philosophy reveals no account in which these sortal distinctions play a direct
role in adequately explaining the problem of aspectual composition [4, 21]. In fact,
amongst those that have explicitly considered this question, the consensus appears to
be that no such explanation is likely to be found [13, 15, 22]. From a computational
perspective this is rather unfortunate, since such distinctions have otherwise proved
quite useful [3, 7, 9, 14].
In this paper, I set out to show that a sortal approach to aspectual composition,
developed in the spirit of the eventuality-based work on episodic representation, can
indeed be explanatory. In so doing, I develop a synthesis of competing proposals by
Hinrichs [8], Krifka [13] and Jackendoff [10] which takes Jackendoff’s cross-cutting sortal
distinctions as its point of departure. To show that the account is well-suited for
computational purposes, I also sketch an implemented calculus of eventualities which
yields many of the desired inferences. Further details on both the model-theoretic
semantics and the implementation can be found in [26].
2 Motivation
From a knowledge-representation perspective, eventuality-based representations have
proven to be convenient for their conciseness, support for underspecificity, and easy inte-
gration with natural language interfaces. For example, consider the following attribute-
value representation of a filling event e0 (the representations in this section are meant
to be reminiscent of the ones in Dale [3], which are in turn based largely upon Bach [1]):


index : e0
sort : event
pred : fill
agent : jack
patient :


index : x0
sort : object
pred : bucket
card : 5


duration :
[
number : 20
unit : minutes
]


Jack filled five buckets in twenty minutes
It should be evident that this structure can be straightforwardly translated into the
English sentence Jack filled five buckets in twenty minutes.1 To see that this repre-
sentation is also concise, note that one can also derive numerous other sentences from
this structure, given appropriate rules of inference: for example, Jack filled a bucket,
Jack filled something, etc. On the other hand, this representation also supports under-
specificity, since from this structure one cannot determine which five buckets were filled
(e.g., bucket A, . . . , bucket E).
As a second example, let us now consider the following representation of a pouring
process e1:


index : e1
sort : process
pred : pour
agent : jack
patient :


index : x1
sort : substance
pred : water


goal :


index : x
a
sort : object
pred : bucket
name : A


duration :
[
number : 30
unit : seconds
]


Jack poured water into bucket A for thirty seconds
It should be evident once again that this structure can be straightforwardly translated
into the English sentence Jack poured water into bucket A for thirty seconds. Moreover,
this representation is similarly concise: given appropriate rules of inference, one can
also derive Jack poured water into bucket A for twenty-five seconds, Jack poured water
into bucket A for twenty seconds, and so forth.2 Finally, this representation likewise
supports underspecificity, since in the absence of any information about the rate of
transfer one cannot determine how much water was poured into bucket A.
As the careful reader may have noticed, the choice of temporal adverbial in the
preceding examples is conditioned by the sort of eventuality in question, which again
depends on the verb. This is not the whole story, however: given a particular amount
of water in the second example, the appropriate adverbial changes (cf. Jack poured
five gallons of water into bucket A *for/in thirty seconds); contrariwise, switching to
a bare plural in the first example, we may note a switch in the opposite direction (cf.
Jack filled buckets for/*in twenty minutes). Adequately explaining dependencies such
as these is the problem of aspectual composition, to which we now turn.
1For simplicity I shall ignore the encoding of tense in this paper.
2While these sentences are clearly not as informative, this is a matter of implicature; to see this,
contrast these sentences with their counterparts in the previous case (i.e., Jack filled five buckets in
fifteen/ten/. . .minutes), which need not be true.
3 A Sortal Approach to Aspectual Composition
To make the ensuing discussion more concrete, let us examine the following possible
representation for the sentence Jack poured five gallons of water into bucket A in thirty
seconds (as in the previous section, this representation is meant to be reminiscent of
those found in [3]):


index : e1
′
sort : event
pred : pour
agent : jack
patient :


index : x1
′
sort : object
pred : water
quantity :
[
number : 5
unit : gallons
]


goal :


index : x
a
sort : object
pred : bucket
name : A


duration :
[
number : 30
unit : seconds
]


Jack poured five gallons of water into bucket A in thirty seconds
Comparing this representation to the previous one (for Jack poured water into bucket
A for thirty seconds), two questions naturally arise:
• Why has e1 changed to e1
′? (And x1 to x1
′?)
• Assuming this has something to do with their differing sortal values, why should
the the sort of e1
′ depend upon that of x1
′ in the first place?
Remarking on a question similar to the first one (and translating their remarks into
the present context), Oberlander and Dale [16] observe that the primed and unprimed
entities cannot be the same, since their respective sorts are assumed to be disjoint.
They then suggest that this is in some sense to be expected, asserting that the two
sentences these representations give rise to convey different perspectives on the same
situation; at the same time though, they also acknowledge that at some level we would
like to tie these two (supposed) perspectives together.
Interestingly, a similar problem arises with Jackendoff’s [10] conception of the binary
feature ±b(ounded), which he introduces to distinguish both events (+b) from processes
(−b) and objects (+b) from substances (−b). According to Jackendoff, “a speaker uses
a −b constituent to refer to an entity whose boundaries are not in view or not of concern;
one can think of the boundaries as outside the current field of view.” Although this
idea has some appeal when one focuses on the discourse-backgrounding function that
atelic sentences can have, it does not seem particularly apt here, where our view of
what has taken place remains constant.
While our two example sentences clearly convey different information, it is not at all
obvious how to make sense of this difference in terms of perspectives. For this reason,
I will pursue an alternative approach below which obviates the need to do so. As we
shall see, this will require us to develop an alternative conception of the event/process
(and object/substance) distinction than Jackendoff appears to have in mind.
Turning now to the second question, we should first note that Jack poured water
into bucket A and Jack filled bucket A with water exhibit different aspectual behavior,
despite the presence of the same mass noun. According to traditional wisdom, the
relevant difference between fill and pour is that only the former encodes what Krifka [13]
calls a set terminal point: if an event e is a filling event, then (presumably) no proper
part of e is also a filling event, and thus fill is taken to encode a set terminal point;
since this argument does not (presumably) go through for pouring events, pour is not
taken to encode a set terminal point. Of course, while pour itself does not supply a set
terminal point, one may be supplied indirectly by specifying a fixed quantity of what is
poured; in this case, the terminal point coincides with the eventual exhaustion of this
quantity.
As Krifka points out, the conventional wisdom about aspectual composition does
not appear to be compatible with a sortal approach:
For consider a concrete event of running and a concrete event of running a
mile; then surely both events have a terminal point (both events might even
be identical). The difference is that an event of running might be part of
another event of running which has a later terminal point, whereas this is
not possible for an event of running a mile.
For this reason, Krifka [13] eschews sortal distinctions (amongst eventualities) and de-
velops an account based upon the reference properties of event predicates instead. Un-
fortunately though, this decision leads to empirical problems with non-individuating
accomplishment expressions, such as run more than a mile ([26]; cf. also Verkuyl [22]):
grammatically, run more than a mile patterns with run a mile, yet according to Krifka’s
test, run more than a mile patterns with run (note that an event of running more than
a mile might be part of another event of running more than a mile).
What Krifka’s observation suggests is that in pursuing a sortal approach, we should
look for alternatives to the sortal distinctions assumed so far, which are based upon
Bach [1]. One possibility is to assume that substances and processes are more abstract
entities than objects and events: for example, rather than letting a substance be a
particular quantity of matter, we may assume a substance is a continuum of such
quantities; likewise, we may take a process to be a continuum of events with differing
durations.
To relate these continua to their particulars, I will borrow Jackendoff’s composed-
of relation (though not necessarily its original semantics). Following Jackendoff, I will
assume that this relation forms part of the meaning ofmeasure phrases, which include
adjectival ones such as five gallons of and adverbial ones such as for thirty seconds.3
3Note that this term is not intended to include restrictive modifiers of measurement, such as in
This yields the following representations for our example sentences:4


index : e1
sort : event
composed-of :


index : e
sort : process
pred : pour
agent : jack
patient :

 index : xsort : substance
pred : water


goal :


index : xa
sort : object
pred : bucket
name : A




duration :
[
number : 30
unit : seconds
]


Jack poured water into bucket A for thirty seconds


index : e1
sort : event
pred : pour
agent : jack
patient :


index : x1
sort : object
composed-of :

 index : xsort : substance
pred : water


quantity :
[
number : 5
unit : gallons
]


goal :


index : xa
sort : object
pred : bucket
name : A


duration :
[
number : 30
unit : seconds
]


Jack poured five gallons of water into bucket A in thirty seconds
To paraphrase, in the first case e1 is an event of duration thirty seconds which is
composed of a process e in which Jack pours the substance x, which is water, into
bucket A. In the second case, e1 is instead an event (again of duration thirty seconds)
thirty seconds or (a) five-gallon (X); although this choice of terminology appears to be consistent with
that of Moltmann [15], perhaps a happier term could be found.
4NB: These representations are not the same as those found in [26], where a more standard logical
representation is employed. For present purposes, this difference is assumed to be of no importance.
in which Jack pours the object x1 into bucket A, where x1 is a five-gallon quantity
(composed-) of the substance x (which is again water).
At this point we may answer the two questions with which we began this section.
With respect to the first question (is it necessary to introduce a new eventuality e1
′ to
represent the second of our two sentences?), the above representations show that we
can now simply treat these two sentences as two different descriptions of the same event
e1 — much as in Krifka’s treatment — without causing a sortal clash.
Returning now to the second question (why should we observe sortal dependencies
in the first place?), let us consider how the conventional wisdom can be reconstructed
here. In [26], I suggest that the relation established by pour between a material entity
and an eventuality is an instance of an incremental thematic relation, following the
terminology of Dowty [6]. What characterizes such relations is how predication over
continua is to be understood: predication should only involve delimited entities (e.g.
various concrete objects) when the relevant participant remains constant across the
continuum. For example, with our pouring process (e), the agent (Jack) and the goal
(bucket A) remain constant across the particular events which make up the continuum.
In contrast, the patient (varying quantities of water) does not remain constant; for this
reason, a substance (x) must be used with the patient role in order to satisfy the above
principle. As a corollary, note that if a particular quantity of water (e.g. x1) is supplied
for the patient role instead, process predication becomes impossible, which forces the
predication to be over an event (e.g. e1). While space precludes further discussion here,
this brief sketch should indicate how the conventional wisdom concerning set terminal
points can be realized along sortal lines.
To conclude this section, I shall briefly compare the present account to two other
related ones. First, in its use of abstract entities (the continua) whose elements (or
realizations) vary in amount, the present account is reminiscent of Hinrichs [8], where
Carlsonian kinds are employed. In contrast to the present approach though, Hinrichs
makes essentially no use of the sortal distinctions he proposes in the eventuality domain;
moreover, unlike Krifka and Jackendoff, he does not propose a uniform treatment of
adjectival and adverbial measure phrases.5 Second, the present account is also very
much in the spirit of Verkuyl [22], especially in its attention to the problems posed by
non-individuating accomplishment expressions. As the next section is intended to show,
however, its sortal basis appears to make it better suited for computational purposes.
4 A Calculus of Eventualities
To illustrate how the present approach to aspectual composition maintains the concise-
ness advantage of eventuality-based knowledge representations cited previously, let us
now consider two examples in some detail.
First, suppose our knowledge base contains the first representation of the event e1
given near the end of the preceding section, repeated below:
5Yet another alternative would be to follow Hinrichs in his use of kinds in the nominal domain only,
while abandonding his quantificational analysis of for-adverbials in favor of an analysis more in the
spirit of Krifka’s approach. To successfully develop such an approach, however, requires several tricky
issues concerning the scope of indefinites to be resolved. These issues are currently under investigation
(in cooperation with Alessandro Zucchi).


index : e1
sort : event
composed-of :


index : e
sort : process
pred : pour
agent : jack
patient :

 index : xsort : substance
pred : water


goal :


index : xa
sort : object
pred : bucket
name : A




duration :
[
number : 30
unit : seconds
]


Jack poured water into bucket A for thirty seconds
From this representation of e1, we should be able to derive the existence of an event e2
in which Jack pours water into bucket A for twenty-five seconds, as well as an event e3
in which he does so for twenty seconds, and so forth. This can be achieved using the
following rule:


index : E1
sort : event
composed-of : E
duration :
[
number : N1
unit : U
]


E for N1 Us
=⇒


index : E2
sort : event
composed-of : E
duration :
[
number : N2
unit : U
]


E for N2 Us
where N2 ≤ N1
This rule reflects a pair of assumptions regarding processes (i.e., process continua)
such as e. First, it is assumed that the particular events making up the continuum e are
closed under the subpart relation; thus, if the event e1 composed-of e has a subevent
e2, then e2 must also be composed-of e. Second, if e1 has duration N1 Us, then for all
non-negative numbers N2 less than N1, e1 is assumed to have a subevent e2 of duration
N2 Us (clearly a simplifying assumption!). Taken together, these two assumptions yield
the above rule as a theorem.
Second, let us now suppose that we have a method for calculating the rate of transfer
for the pouring process e above, and that this rate multiplied by thirty seconds turns out
to be five gallons. Using this information, we should then be able to derive the second
representation of the event e1 given near the end of the preceding section (repeated
below) from the first one.


index : e1
sort : event
pred : pour
agent : jack
patient :


index : x1
sort : object
composed-of :

 index : xsort : substance
pred : water


quantity :
[
number : 5
unit : gallons
]


goal :


index : xa
sort : object
pred : bucket
name : A


duration :
[
number : 30
unit : seconds
]


Jack poured five gallons of water into bucket A in thirty seconds
This can be achieved using the following rule:


index : E1
sort : event
composed-of :


index : E
sort : process
pred : pour
agent : A
patient : X
goal : G


duration :
[
number : N1
unit : U1
]


A pours X into G for N1 U1s
=⇒


index : E1
sort : event
pred : pour
agent : A
patient :


index : X1
sort : object
composed-of : X
quantity :
[
number : N2
unit : U2
]


goal : G
duration :
[
number : N1
unit : U1
]


A pours N2 U2s of X into G in N1 U1s
where N2 = rate(E,U2, U1) × N1
Since this rule may look overly complicated at first glance, let us pause to consider why
it makes sense. Because the process E of which the event E1 is composed is understood
to be a continuum of pouring events, all with agent A and goal G, we can derive that
E1 in particular is a pouring event with agent A and goal G. As for the patient of E1,
we may note that since the patient of E is understood to the continuum X of quantities
poured, one of these must be the patient of E1; supposing that its index is X1, we can
then derive that X1 is both the patient of E1 and composed of X . (The calculation
of X1’s amount, N2 U2s, is not of particular concern here, and thus is assumed to be
straightforward.)
In the actual implementation, this rule has been generalized to handle other verbs
which form incremental thematic relations, such as dribble, drip, leak, ooze, seep, siphon
and so on. Several additional cases have also been implemented, including the pro-
gressive, at-adverbials and the aspectual verbs start, stop and finish. These rules are
described in detail in [26].
5 Space and Time Linked
The present account extends naturally to cover motion verbs, which are assumed to form
incremental thematic relations between paths and eventualities (rather than between
material entities and eventualities). For the most part, all that is required is to introduce
the appropriate counterparts of the substances and processes into the domain of directed
spatial entities.
Following Krifka, I will assume that events of directed motion have spatial traces
as well as temporal ones, i.e., that each directed motion event has a unique (delimited)
path and time interval associated with it. With directed motion processes, however,
this cannot be the case, given the present conception of predication over continua:
while a continuum of motion events may have the same agent and the same manner
of motion, the path traversed does not remain constant. Consequently, if a directed
motion process is to have a unique path associated with it, the path must likewise be
a continuum, i.e. what I shall call a non-delimited path.
Once the notion of incremental thematic relation has been extended to the case of
directed motion eventualities in this way, it remains only to examine the sortal restric-
tions which make sense for various path predicates. For example, with to-phrases (e.g.
to the bridge), which specify endpoints, we may naturally assume that their translations
are only well-sorted with delimited paths, since endpoints do not remain constant across
a continuum of such paths. As a result, expressions such as Jack run to the bridge will
give rise to predicates restricted to events, in contrast to Jack run (which can apply to
processes as well). This explains why * Jack ran to the bridge for thirty seconds is not
well-formed, as illustrated below (recall that the composed-of relation serves to map
processes to events):


index : e1
sort : event
* composed-of :


index : e
sort : event
pred : run
agent : jack
path :


index : p
sort : delimited-path
pred : to
ref-obj :
[
index : b
pred : bridge
]




duration :
[
number : 30
unit : seconds
]


* Jack ran to the bridge for thirty seconds
Unlike to-phrases, towards-phrases do make sense for non-delimited paths, since
these specify direction rather than endpoints (and direction can remains constant across
a continuum). As such, Jack ran towards the bridge for thirty seconds receives the
following well-formed translation:


index : e1
sort : event
composed-of :


index : e
sort : process
pred : run
agent : jack
path :


index : p
sort : non-delimited-path
pred : towards
ref-obj :
[
index : b
pred : bridge
]




duration :
[
number : 30
unit : seconds
]


Jack ran towards the bridge for thirty seconds
As an aside, it is worth observing that non-delimited paths need not be unbounded. This
is especially important with predicates such as towards, since the reference object here
serves to impose an upper limit on how far the continuum can extend. For example,
consider the process e above of Jack running towards the bridge (assumed to be of more
or less constant speed and direction). Although the continuum e may contain events
larger than e1, it cannot contain any events larger than the event in which Jack reaches
the bridge, as the path of any such event would no longer satisfy the predicated yielded
by towards the bridge. Because the present notion of delimitedness is independent of
boundedness (in the mathematical sense), the presence of upper bounds in cases such
as this one is entirely unproblematic.
Another interesting case is that of along. In general, distance cannot be predicated
of a non-delimited path, as distance varies according to the endpoints. This is not the
case, however, with proximal distance, i.e. the distance between the path and the
reference object, which can remain constant across a path continuum. This explains
why sentences like Jack ran along the river, two hundred yards from the shore, for thirty
seconds should be well-formed.
Finally we turn to distance phrases. As mentioned above, distance cannot be sen-
sibly predicated of non-delimited paths, so I will assume that distance predication is
restricted to delimited paths. Consequently, bare distance phrases will behave just like
to-PPs, which explains both why Jack ran two miles to the bridge is fine and why *
Jack ran two miles for ten minutes is out. Now, what about distance phrases headed
by for? Remarkably, these adverbials have been almost completely ignored in the liter-
ature. As with their temporal counterparts, I will assume that distance for-adverbials
form measure phrases, i.e. serve to introduce the composed-of mapping. By making
this natural assumption, we may then explain the curious fact that * Jack ran to the
bridge for two miles is horrible, in sharp contrast to both Jack ran two miles to the
bridge and Jack ran along the river for two miles. This is illustrated below:


index : e1
sort : event
* composed-of :


index : e
sort : event
pred : run
agent : jack
path :


index : p
sort : delimited-path
pred : to
ref-obj :
[
index : b
pred : bridge
]




distance :
[
number : 2
unit : miles
]


* Jack ran to the bridge for two miles


index : e1
sort : event
pred : run
agent : jack
path :


index : p1
sort : delimited-path
pred : to
ref-obj :
[
index : b
pred : bridge
]


distance :
[
number : 2
unit : miles
]


Jack ran two miles to the bridge


index : e1
sort : event
composed-of :


index : e
sort : process
pred : run
agent : jack
path :


index : p
sort : non-delimited-path
pred : along
ref-obj :
[
index : r
pred : river
]




distance :
[
number : 2
unit : miles
]


Jack ran along the river for two miles
One consequence of the present approach is that Jack run along the river for two miles
and Jack run two miles along the river are assigned rather different representations.
Although space precludes further discussion here, this should not be considered partic-
ularly troublesome since these sentences can easily be made to be mutually entailing.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that a sortal approach to aspectual composition, developed
in the spirit of the eventuality-based work on episodic representation, can indeed be
explanatory. In so doing, I have argued against the prevailing opinion in the linguistics
and philosophy literature that such approaches inherently represent a dead end. In
support of this view, I have developed a synthesis of competing proposals by Hinrichs [8],
Krifka [13] and Jackendoff [10] which takes Jackendoff’s cross-cutting sortal distinctions
as its point of departure (cf. [26] for further details). Nevertheless, many other possible
ways of implementing a sortal approach remain to be explored, as do many empirical
issues, and thus the question of whether a sortal approach to aspectual composition is
to be preferred is likely to remain open for some time.
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